Economic reform and the political economy of the German welfare state by Streeck, Wolfgang & Trampusch, Christine
www.ssoar.info
Economic reform and the political economy of the
German welfare state
Streeck, Wolfgang; Trampusch, Christine
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Streeck, W., & Trampusch, C. (2005). Economic reform and the political economy of the German welfare state.
German Politics, 14(2), 174-195. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-114340
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Economic Reform and the Political Economy
of the German Welfare State
WOLFGANG STREECK and CHRISTINE TRAMPUSCH
The central problem of the German economy is the high costs of labour, driven
up by the burden of funding an extensive welfare state through social insurance
contributions that operate as payroll taxes on employment. The study identifies
the political causes of the long-term rise in non-wage labour costs. It analyses
the reforms of the last decade, showing how the multiplicity of veto points
in the German political economy has weakened reform initiatives and reduced
the prospect for effective reform in the foreseeable future.
Contrary to widespread belief, the German economy does not suffer from a lack of
international competitiveness.1 Despite the high value of the euro, the trade surplus
continues to rise. Employment in exposed sectors, while declining as elsewhere, con-
tinues to exceed that in any comparable country, indicating that German industry has
maintained its outstanding competitive performance. Industrial wages are high, but are
offset by high and fast-rising productivity.2
Nor does the German economy face particular difficulties with respect to inter-
nationalisation. Notwithstanding employment protection, co-determination and high
wage levels, inward foreign investment remains buoyant, attracted by an excellent
infrastructure, a high skill workforce and peaceful labour relations.3 German firms
have substantially expanded their activities abroad in order to compete for market
share. During the past decade, firms like Siemens, BASF, BMW, Volkswagen,
Daimler-Benz, and Hoechst, have evolved into true multinationals. Well into the
1990s, the domestic employment effects of outward investment have been generally
benevolent. A decline in low-skilled jobs has been compensated by growth in high-
skilled employment, resulting in an upgrading of the employment structure
with only minor losses in the volume of employment.4
Nevertheless, there is a severe and worsening employment problem, and it is here
that an analysis of malfunction in German economic institutions must begin. For almost
two decades now, high unemployment has been combined with low participation in the
labour market, resulting in a remarkably low rate of employment. Given that employ-
ment in industry is above the international average, the explanation is low employment
growth in services, especially domestically traded services.5 While this has long been
known, it has been largely neglected for a number of reasons. Above all, many of those
outside employment have been supported by comparatively liberal unemployment
benefits, or attractive early retirement terms.6 Others were kept out of the labour
market by extended periods of education.7 Moreover, a low rate of female participation
German Politics, Vol.14, No.2 (June 2005), pp.174–195
ISSN 0964-4008 print=1743-8993 online
DOI: 10.1080=09644000500154490# 2005 Association for the Study of German Politics
in the labour market turned the family into another holding pen for those unlikely to
find employment in a stagnant labour market.8
It is now obvious, however, that the country can no longer afford to treat a low
employment rate as a matter of political choice, or as the expression of a national pre-
ference for industrial rather than service-sector occupations. Taking surplus labour out
of the market on comparatively comfortable terms has become less and less possible
due to an endemic financial crisis of the state. The resultant benefit cuts make non-
employment increasingly unacceptable to a growing number of people. Not only
does this cause political discontent, but it also sets in motion a transformation of the
employment system from below, in the form of the emergence – unprecedented in
the post-war German economy – of a sizeable number of ‘working poor’.9
These problems are compounded dramatically by the slow growth of the German
economy.10 Slow growth contributes to a crisis of public finance that is exacerbated
by downward pressure on public revenues resulting from tax competition with other
countries and the perceived desire of citizens for tax cuts. Tax cuts coincide with the
obligation incurred under European Monetary Union to consolidate public finances,
resulting in an apparently unending series of austerity budgets. At the same time, govern-
ments at all levels are faced with business demands for a well-developed infrastructure
and high levels of education as a condition for continuing to produce in Germany.
There are also indications that Germany is beginning to lag behind other countries in
high-technology sectors and high value-added products.11 Moreover, low-cost com-
petition from potential high-quality producers in Eastern Europe is making it harder
for German production sites to compensate for high costs through superior productivity
and product quality. In short, not only are the old ways of living with low employment
becoming gradually unviable, but the highly productive employment that in the past paid
for the pacification of the unemployed may be about to break away at a much faster pace.
Where does an affluent country facing slow impoverishment begin with economic
reform? An often-cited suspect is Germany’s vast and expensive welfare state. Indeed,
comparative research has produced convincing evidence that it is the particular
characteristics of the Bismarckian welfare state – funded through social security con-
tributions and geared to status maintenance rather than protection from poverty – that
depresses the level of employment by inflating the costs of labour. High non-wage
labour costs interact with unemployment in a vicious circle. By making labour more
expensive, they induce firms to downsize their labour force, in the past typically
through early retirement. They also prevent employment growth in labour-intensive
sectors, especially in services. Alternatively they drive labour into the black
economy, reducing the revenues of the social insurance funds, thus pushing up contri-
bution rates. The same effect is caused by unemployment and non-employment, to the
extent that individuals are supported by the pension or the unemployment insurance
system. As rates rise in response to declining employment or increasing entitlements,
labour costs also rise, reducing employment even more. In the end, the very instru-
ments which used to make unemployment socially acceptable become a cause
of even more unemployment.12
Cutting non-wage labour costs in order to raise employment is, however, not an easy
feat to accomplish as it must involve one or more of three things: cuts in the entitlements
of future and, especially, current beneficiaries; a shift from public to private provision
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paid for by individuals with no contribution from their employers; and a change in the
funding base of the welfare state from contributions to taxes. Given the demographics
of an ageing population, the same applies in principle when the objective is much less
ambitious and involves no more than freezing non-wage labour costs at the current level.
Freezing, however, is clearly not enough. Apart from the fact that it leaves the
relationship of mutual reinforcement between high labour costs and low employment
intact, it would require growing infusions of tax money that would be urgently needed
for investment in the physical infrastructure and in research and innovation. This is
another, more recent way in which welfare state compensation for unemployment
and low employment contributes to exacerbating the problem that it is supposed to
remedy. For example, by the early 2000s the budget of the Federal Labour Office
(around E50 billion) was almost double the combined budget of all German univer-
sities (about E27 billion).13 Thus a fundamental precondition for a successful
defence of German prosperity is moving resources from the satisfaction of mostly
consumptive entitlements into investment in productive capacities. It is for this
reason that economic reform must focus above all on the welfare state.
THE RISE OF NON-WAGE LABOUR COSTS
The German welfare system consists of four major elements: pension insurance, unem-
ployment insurance, health insurance and long-term care insurance. Whereas pension
and unemployment insurance receive federal subsidies, health insurance was until 2003
exclusively funded by contributions, and long-term care insurance still is. Long-term
care insurance was introduced in 1995, at a time when the social insurance system
was already beginning to crumble under the burden of German unification. The
main period of expansion of the German social insurance system was during the
heyday of Modell Deutschland in the 1970s and early 1980s, the success of which
was based on a subtle interaction between the welfare state, the system of collective
bargaining and the federal budget.14 Social security supported the remarkably success-
ful adjustment to declining mass production and later helped the country cope with the
socio-economic and political challenges caused by German unification. The latter
brought West German welfare standards to East Germans nearly overnight, allaying
any political discontent that might have arisen from the dismantling of state socialism.
TheWest German welfare system responded to the economic crisis after unification
by transforming East Germany rapidly into a state-supported secondary labour market
and a society of early retirees. Owing to decades of extensive use of the social insur-
ance system to absorb surplus labour created by high wages, low wage dispersion and
German unification, combined social insurance contributions steadily increased, and by
1996 they exceeded the magic figure of 40 per cent of gross wages (Table 1). Between
1990 and 1998 alone, the combined social insurance contribution rate grew by six and a
half percentage points, from 35.5 per cent to 42.1 per cent, of which German unification
accounted for about three percentage points.15
One of the typical characteristics of the German social insurance system is its
fragmentation into four separate budgets. This allows the government to mask financial
difficulties by complex fiscal manoeuvres involving the different parafiscal social insur-
ance funds and the federal budget. Since the early 1980s, the government has with
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increasing skill hidden rising contribution rates and avoided spending cuts by means of
financial transfers between the social insurance funds and by infusing federal tax money
into the social insurance system. For example, in 1977 the government made the unem-
ployment insurance fund pay pension contributions for recipients of unemployment
benefit. It was thus able to keep the pay-as-you-go pension system liquid without an
increase in the contribution rate, at the price of creating additional future entitlements.
Similarly, from 1992, the unemployment insurance fund has to pay pension insurance
contributions for participants in job creation measures in eastern Germany. While this
increased the revenue of the pension insurance fund, it caused a long-term increase in
unemployment insurance contributions. Moreover, to stabilise the combined social insur-
ance contribution rate between 1981 and 1991, the government several times balanced a
rise in one contribution rate by lowering another, causing long-term fiscal problems for
those systems whose contribution rates were lowered.
TABLE 1
CONTRIBUTION RATES BETWEEN 1949 AND 2003, AS OF THE END OF THE YEAR
Year Unemployment Pension
Health
care Total Year Unemployment Pension
Health
care Total
1949 4.0 10.0 6.0 20.0 1977 3.0 18.0 11.4 32.4
1950 4.0 10.0 6.0 20.0 1978 3.0 18.0 11.4 32.4
1951 4.0 10.0 6.0 20.0 1979 3.0 18.0 11.2 32.2
1952 4.0 10.0 6.0 20.0 1980 3.0 18.0 11.4 32.4
1953 4.0 10.0 6.0 20.0 1981 3.0 18.5 11.8 33.3
1954 4.0 10.0 6.2 20.2 1982 4.0 18.0 12.0 34.0
1955 3.0 11.0 6.2 20.2 1983 4.6 18.5 11.8 34.9
1956 3.0 11.0 6.2 20.2 1984 4.6 18.5 11.4 34.5
1957 2.0 14.0 7.8 23.8 1985 4.1 19.2 11.8 35.1
1958 2.0 14.0 8.4 24.4 1986 4.0 19.2 12.2 35.4
1959 2.0 14.0 8.4 24.4 1987 4.3 18.7 12.6 35.6
1960 2.0 14.0 8.4 24.4 1988 4.3 18.7 12.9 35.9
1961 0.0 14.0 9.4 23.4 1989 4.3 18.7 12.9 35.9
1962 1.4 14.0 9.6 25.0 1990 4.3 18.7 12.5 35.5
1963 1.4 14.0 9.6 25.0 1991 6.8 17.7 12.3 36.8
1964 1.3 14.0 9.7 25.0 1992 6.3 17.7 12.5 36.5
1965 1.3 14.0 9.9 25.2 1993 6.5 17.5 13.2 37.2
1966 1.3 14.0 10.0 25.3 1994 6.5 19.2 13.3 39.0
1967 1.3 14.0 10.1 25.4 1995 6.5 18.6 13.1 39.9
1968 1.3 15.0 10.2 26.5 1996 6.5 19.2 13.7 41.1
1969 1.3 16.0 10.5 27.8 1997 6.5 20.3 13.4 41.9
1970 1.3 17.0 8.2 26.5 1998 6.5 20.3 13.6 42.1
1971 1.3 17.0 8.2 26.5 1999 6.5 19.5 13.6 41.3
1972 1.7 17.0 8.4 27.1 2000 6.5 19.3 13.6 41.1
1973 1.7 18.0 9.2 28.9 2001 6.5 19.1 13.6 40.9
1974 1.7 18.0 9.5 29.2 2002 6.5 19.1 14.0 41.3
1975 2.0 18.0 10.5 30.5 2003 6.5 19.5 14.3 42.0
1976 3.0 18.0 11.3 32.3
Total: from 1995 including long-term care. Until June 1996 the contribution rate was 1.0 per cent. In July
1996 it increased to 1.7 per cent.
Source: 1949 to 2002: ‘Christine Trampusch, Ein Bu¨ndnis fu¨r die nachhaltige Finanzierung der Sozialversicher-
ungssysteme: Interessenvermittlung in der deutschen Arbeitsmarkt- und Rentenpolitik’, MPIfG Discussion
Paper 03/1 (Ko¨ln: Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r Gesellschaftsforschung, 2003); for the data on health insurance in
2002 and 2003: BDA, Beitragssa¨tze zur Sozialversicherung, http://www.bdaonline.de/www/bdaonline.nsf/id/
GraphikBeitragssaetzezurSozial/$file/Beitragssa¨tze.pdf (6 Dec 2004).
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A second means of avoiding increased contributions was to subsidise social budgets
through federal grants to the pension and unemployment insurance funds (Table 2) and
by federal transfers of benefits not calculated according to actuarial principles.
Between 1981 and 2003, federal support for the pension insurance system increased
from 18 to 26 per cent of the latter’s total revenue (E14 to E61 billion; Table 2). In
1993, the then Bundesanstalt and now Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, which runs the unem-
ployment insurance system, received a federal grant of E13 billion to cover the extra
costs of German unification. In the 1990s, short-term consolidation of the social insur-
ance budgets by means of federal subsidies was often financed by tax increases. At the
end of 1997, an increase in the pension contribution rate was avoided by raising the
value added tax from 15 to 16 per cent. In 1999, federal subsidisation of the pension
TABLE 2
FEDERAL SUBSIDIES FOR PENSION AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FUNDS, 1981 – 2003









In % of total
revenue of pension
insurance fund In Em
As % of total
expenditure of
unemployment
insurance fund In Em




1981 13,933 17.75 1,457 10.1 4,197 29.1
1982 15,737 19.47 2,564 15.0 3,581 21.0
1983 15,888 19.76 3,642 17.6 806 4.8
1984 16,776 19.66 4,458 29.6 0 0.0
1985 17,155 19.03 4,666 30.7 0 0.0
1986 17,591 18.56 4,683 28.7 0 0.0
1987 18,203 18.79 4,617 25.1 0 0.0
1988 18,866 18.63 4,318 20.7 459 2.2
1989 19,532 18.38 4,195 20.6 987 4.8
1990 20,371 17.71 3,879 17.3 361 1.6
1991 25,808 18.51 3,648 9.9 524 1.4
1992 29,820 19.84 4,656 9.7 4,571 9.6
1993 31,978 20.58 7,145 12.8 12,485 22.3
1994 36,651 21.36 8,912 17.5 5,186 10.2
1995 37,470 20.90 10,486 21.1 3,522 7.1
1996 39,454 20.98 12,386 22.9 7,033 13.0
1997 42,229 21.41 14,315 27.3 4,895 9.3
1998 49,214 24.09 15,563 30.8 3,947 7.8
1999 49,822 23.52 15,581 30.1 3,739 7.2
2000 49,795 23.21 13,161 26.1 867 1.7
2001 53,342 24.21 12,778 24.3 1,900 3.6
2002 56,657 25.34 14,756 26.1 5,600 9.9
2003 61,173 26.38 16,532 31.1 6,200 11.7
Unemployment assistance is not included in the budget of the unemployment insurance fund.
Source: Pension insurance: VDR (Verband der Deutschen Rentenversicherungstra¨ger), Einnahmen der Renten-
versicherung, http://www.vdr.de/internet/vdr/statzr.nsf/($URLRef)/5F0E1B53C4AC2A6FC1256A390043F88D
(22 Nov 2004); Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit: Bundesministerium fu¨r Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung (BMGS),
Statistisches Taschenbuch, Arbeits- und Sozialstatistik (Bonn, 2004), http://www.bmgs.bund.de/download/
statistiken/stat2004/Stb8_14.xls (22 Nov 2004); Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, Haushaltsplan Haushaltsjahr 2004
(Nu¨rnberg, 2004); Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, Referat IIIc2 (Haushaltsreferat, Finanzauswertungen und Finanz-
planung) Diplom-Verwaltungswirt Dieter Spetzke.
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fund was continued by the Red–Green government with the introduction of the eco-tax
on energy and gasoline, whose fifth and last stage came into effect in 2004.
As a result of the decade-old practice of parafiscal burden-shifting and of balancing
the social insurance funds by federal tax subsidies, the different social insurance
budgets and the federal budget are now closely intertwined. Changes in contribution
rates and benefit reductions in one of the social insurance schemes affect not only
the other social insurance schemes but often the federal budget also. Lowering
contributions in one branch of the social insurance system may require increases in
another and is thus unlikely to have a discernible effect on total contributions. Put
another way, structural reforms of only one of the four social insurance systems may
merely exacerbate the crisis in the social insurance system as a whole.
The recession of 1992–93 changed the interaction between the budgets of the
welfare state and the federal government, underlining that a social insurance system
that had hitherto imposed no discernible cost to economic growth had become a
burden. High non-wage labour costs had created a strong impediment to economic
growth and a disincentive to private sector job creation, especially in labour-intensive
service sectors. Additionally, European Stability Pact limits on state deficits had
reduced the government’s room for fiscal manoeuvre to subsidise the social insurance
budgets. Rising non-wage labour costs and high unemployment also strained the
loyalties of the constituencies of employer associations and trade unions.16 By
the mid-1990s, pressures for reform had grown enormously.
Reform, however, is not easy in the German political system. German unification
increased the number of La¨nder to 16, with independently scheduled La¨nder elections
turning national politics into an almost permanent election campaign.17 During
Schro¨der’s first term there were 15 state elections, seven in 1999, two in 2000, four
in 2001, and two in 2002. In addition there was the European election of 1999. In
the first Land election after its accession to power (in Hesse in early 1999), the
Red–Green government lost its majority in the Second Chamber, the Bundesrat.
Since the February 2003 election in Lower Saxony, the opposition had held a solid
Bundesrat majority that gives it veto power over all major legislation.
One way of lowering the costs of labour is moderation in collective wage bargain-
ing. Here Germany has, on the whole, done surprisingly well.18 In a Bismarckian
welfare state, however, lower labour costs also require lower contributions to the
three main sectors of the welfare state: pensions, unemployment insurance and
labour market policy, reducing the financial burden imposed by the state on the
employment relationship. Since coming to power in 1998, the Red–Green government
has initiated a series of measures for welfare state reform in an effort to control public
spending and increase employment. As we will show in the following sections, all of
them have failed and indeed the entire political capital the government had available
for welfare state reform had to be spent on keeping contributions at the level of 1998.
PENSIONS
Until recently the basic principle of Germany’s contribution-financed statutory
pension system was maintaining the living standards of workers during retirement
(Lebenstandardsicherung). Entitlements were calculated on the basis of the length of
ECONOMIC REFORM AND THE GERMAN WELFARE STATE 179
their insurance record and the amount of contributions paid (calculated as a percentage
of income, up to a cut-off point). In addition, the 1957 pension reform linked pensions
to changes in the gross pay of active workers. The main aim of the government’s
pension policy was to adjust the revenues of the pension insurance funds to the
expenditure required to serve the entitlements of those drawing pensions.
Since public pensions maintained living standards, the statutory pension system
became the institutional core of the early retirement regime.19 High public pensions
allowed firms to restructure and close down plants without harsh conflicts with trade
unions. Redundancies were chosen so as to make early retirement possible for older
employees.20 The manufacturing industry in particular soon learned how to make
use of early exit options.21 Early retirement policy allowed unions to adhere to their
high-wage strategy because it absorbed surplus labour. It is not surprising that early
retirement soon began to account for a growing part of the expenditure of the
pension system. The result was both increasing statutory non-wage labour costs and
higher government subsidies for pension funds, which were partially financed
through higher taxes. Whereas in 1970 the federal budget accounted for 18.9 per
cent of the total revenue of the pension insurance system, by 2000 this had risen to
23.2 per cent.22
In 1997, under pressure from rapidly increasing non-wage labour costs (Table 1;
Figure 1), the Kohl government broke with the traditional consensus style of pension
policy.23 A reform aimed at stabilising the rate of insurance contribution introduced
FIGURE 1
CONTRIBUTION RATES TO PENSION, HEALTH AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE,
1949 – 2003
Source: See Table 1.
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the principle of einnahmeorientierte Ausgabenpolitik, where benefits depend on reven-
ues rather than vice versa, as previously.24 Against the resistance of the opposition
SPD a so-called ‘demographic factor’ was introduced, aimed at taking into account
the increase in life expectancy. The demographic factor was to reduce the replacement
rate of the ‘standard pensioner’ from 70 per cent in 1999 to 64 per cent in 2030.
Moreover, disability pensions were cut by actuarial deductions.
The Kohl reforms contributed to the success of the Social Democrats in the 1998
Bundestag election.25 During the campaign the SPD had promised to undo the cuts
in benefits. Immediately after its accession to power, it delivered on its promise with
the 1998 ‘Act to Correct Social Insurance and Guarantee the Rights of Employees’
(Gesetz zu Korrekturen in der Sozialversicherung und zur Sicherung der Arbeitnehmer-
rechte). The law suspended the demographic factor and removed the cuts in disability
pensions. The government also lowered the rate of contribution to pension insurance
from 20.3 to 19.5 per cent, even though the suspension of the Kohl reforms was
bound to cause higher expenditure. Schro¨der believed, however, that revenues could
be increased by extending compulsory social insurance to certain categories of self-
employed, which were declared to be pseudo-self-employed (Scheinselbststa¨ndige).
In addition, in April 1999 the government introduced social insurance contributions
for jobs in the low-wage sector, hoping that this would also generate revenues for
the pension insurance scheme (630-DM-Reform). However, both reforms had the oppo-
site effect as they added to the rigidity of the labour market and created new incentives
to work in the underground economy.26
Suspension of the demographic factor was followed by numerous ad hoc measures
aimed at stabilising the contribution rate without having to cut benefits. Most important
among these were the ecological tax reform; a pension freeze in 2000–01, which tied
pensions to consumer prices instead of wages; coverage out of the federal budget of
a pension supplement for time spent child-rearing; and federal reimbursement of the
pension funds for payments to specific groups of pensioners in the former GDR. The
measures were accompanied by further reductions in the rate of contribution, from
19.5 to 19.3 per cent in 2000 and from 19.3 to 19.1 per cent in 2001. All in all, the gov-
ernment managed to lower the pension contribution rate between April 1999 and
January 2001 by 1.2 percentage points. Taxation required to subsidise the pension
system, however, took the estimated overall contribution rate of the average employee
to around 28 per cent of gross wages.27
Having stretched the federal budget to its limit,28 the measures of 1999 unintention-
ally forced the government to consider structural reforms that went beyond short-term
fiscal remedies. It faced opposition, however, from trade unions like IG Metall that
demanded a reduction in the statutory age of retirement to age 60 (Rente mit 60),
which would have greatly accelerated the collapse of the social insurance system.
Nevertheless, in June 1999 Labour Minister Walter Riester announced a major over-
haul of the pension system to limit the contribution rate to a maximum of 22 per
cent in 2030. At the core of his proposal was a mandatory private pension, which
would have allowed the public pension to decline. This, in turn, would have held
employer contributions constant, alleviating pressure on non-wage labour costs. The
proposal was at loggerheads with social democratic plans to extend mandatory
pension insurance to additional groups of employees and to other forms of income
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than wage.29 Unions, the opposition and the public violently objected to an obligatory
private ‘third pillar’, and with the SPD suffering recurrent defeats in La¨nder elections,
the government was forced to make concessions. Rather than making supplementary
pensions obligatory, it adopted a more expensive strategy of liberal tax subsidies for
workers choosing to buy supplementary pension plans. Nonetheless, polls showed
that no more than 18 per cent of the voters regarded the SPD as the most credible
party on pension policy.30
Against all expectation, the pension reform, enacted in 2001, became one of the
more lasting achievements of Schro¨der’s first term. The so-called Riester-Rente
encouraged workers to take out private or occupational supplementary pension
plans, helped by a government subsidy of up to E10 billion a year. Employees can
now put a maximum of one per cent of their pay into a private savings account,
rising to four per cent in 2008. Subsidies for these Entgeltumwandlung accounts,
however, are conditional on the existence of a collective agreement signed by
unions and employers (the so-called Tarifvorrang). The reform signalled a cautious
move from a public pay-as-you-go system towards a privately funded system. In
addition, a new formula for calculating pension benefits was introduced to reduce
the pension level for the so-called ‘standard pensioner’ to 67 per cent of net income
by 2030. Due to the high cost of government subsidies for private and occupational
pension plans the reform will not really save money. It does, however, help keep
non-wage labour costs in check.31
Still, pension reform and the energy tax failed to reduce overall non-wage labour
costs during Schro¨der’s first term. The most that was accomplished was a brief
respite.32 Shortly after its surprising re-election in 2002, the government had to recog-
nise that the pension system needed yet more money. Its response was to plug the holes
in social insurance budgets with a confusing mix of tax increases, spending cuts, higher
contributions and new borrowing. On pensions, the most important measures of the
so-called ‘Act to Stabilise Contribution Rates’ were an increase in the contribution
rate by 0.4 percentage points to 19.5 per cent, which the Greens opposed; an increase
in the income ceiling for contributions to the statutory pension system; and a reduction
of the fluctuation reserve (Schwankungsreserve) of the statutory pension insurance
system from 80 to 50 per cent of monthly expenditure (Monatsausgabe). To keep
the contribution rate at 19.5 per cent, further emergency measures were put into
effect, including another pension freeze in 2004 (Nullrunde), a further lowering of
the minimum required fluctuation reserve from 50 to 20 per cent, and full contributions
by pensioners to long-term care insurance from 2004 onwards. In addition, the disbur-
sement of pensions was shifted from the beginning of the month to the end. As result,
net pensions were effectively cut by 0.85 per cent in 2004.33
Whilst failing to bring about a lasting reduction of non-wage labour costs, the
haphazard emergency surgeries performed on the pensions system since 1999 entailed
major risks for the federal budget. In May 2003, the federal subsidy to the pension
insurance system amounted to no less than E54 billion, and the Ministry of Finance
forecast that by 2050 it would rise to more than half the federal budget if nothing
were done.34 By 2004 it was obvious that the limits of piecemeal tinkering had been
reached and that more fundamental changes were required, although the direction
these would take was far from clear. Ironically, the government seems to have returned
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to its starting point. The 2004 law that adds a ‘sustainability factor’ to the pension
formula to take into account the declining birth rate and the increasing life expectancy
bore an uncanny resemblance to the Kohl government’s ‘demographic factor’. The
measure had been suggested by a government-appointed expert commission in mid-
2003. In addition, the commission proposed cutting pensions to 40 per cent of
average gross earnings, from the present 48 per cent; a gradual increase in the statutory
retirement age from 65 to 67 by 2035; and a capping of pension contributions at 22 per
cent of gross monthly pay.35
THE LABOUR MARKET
Like the pension system, unemployment insurance played a crucial role in the
traditional management of the German employment crisis.36 The very expensive
labour market programmes of what is now the Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit removed
surplus labour from the market by providing unemployment benefit over long
periods of time and extensive subsidies for short-term work, job creation and further
training. In effect this created a huge secondary labour market at public expense.
Next to the pension insurance system, the Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit (governed on a
tripartite basis by the state and the social partners) became the focal institution for
German social policy in the aftermath of unification. Labour market programmes
expanded to unprecedented levels,37 adding to non-wage labour costs and generating
a spiral in which the very policy that was to fight unemployment became a potent
contributor to it. In 2002 the Bundesagentur had a staff of 90,000 and a budget of
E50 billion, around 40 per cent of which it spent on so-called ‘active labour market
policies’.38
Throughout its first term, the Red–Green government left labour market policy and
the unemployment insurance system almost entirely untouched. The Chancellor
delegated labour market reform to the tripartite talks of the Bu¨ndnis fu¨r Arbeit, which
began in December 1998. Deadlocked almost from the beginning,39 the Bu¨ndnis
achieved nothing of significance apart from the so-called Job Aqtiv-Gesetz and two sym-
bolic pilot projects to improve the labour market situation of low-skilled workers, the
long-term unemployed and low-income families. Job-Aqtiv promised minor improve-
ments in placement services for the unemployed. It also introduced what was sold to
the public as the ‘Danish job rotation model’ and pretended to improve the control
and evaluation of active labour market measures. At the same time, it extended publicly
funded employment programmes. None of themeasures produced any effect before they
were overtaken by the so-called ‘Hartz reforms’ after the 2002 election.
In addition to the deadlocked Bu¨ndnis fu¨r Arbeit, another reason for inactivity on
labour market policy in Schro¨der’s first term was that Minister of Finance and party
chairman Oskar Lafontaine insisted on following through election promises to the
trade unions that made reform of the labour market practically impossible. For
example, the government suspended a rule forcing firms to reimburse the unemploy-
ment insurance fund for benefits paid to workers sent into early retirement. Moreover,
the government rescinded legislation obliging unemployed persons to show up at
the job centre four times a year and to accept job offers that required them to
commute for up to three hours a day. Further, employment protection was restored
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for workers in firms with between five and ten employees, and low-paid part-time
jobs were made subject to social insurance contributions. In addition, and in accord-
ance with what he regarded as a ‘Keynesian’ economic policy, Lafontaine encouraged
high wage claims from unions outside the public sector, thereby undercutting
Schro¨der’s attempts to use the tripartite talks of the Bu¨ndnis for wage moderation.
With the Red–Green government abstaining from labour market policy reform, the
unemployment insurance system was just as starved of cash as the pension and health
insurance systems. Soon after the 1998 election victory, the government had to
implement measures to stabilise the unemployment insurance contribution rate and
to limit its own payments to the Bundesagentur.40 From June 2000 to July 2002, unem-
ployment benefits were frozen in real terms, no longer rising with average wages as in
the past. In addition, in 1999 the government abolished Origina¨re Arbeitslosenhilfe, a
special form of unemployment assistance paid by the federal budget – a measure that
the SPD had opposed under the Kohl government. At the same time, to limit youth
unemployment the government passed the Emergency Programme to Reduce Youth
Unemployment (JUMP) subsidising 100,000 jobs and apprenticeships for workers
up to 25 years of age, which again imposed a burden on the federal budget.
A first step towards a reform of the public employment service was provoked by the
so-called placement scandal at the Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit. In February 2002, when
the government faced certain defeat in the upcoming federal election, it discovered
what had long been widely known among insiders, that the statistics of the public
employment service on its rate of success in job placement were largely fictional. To
show the public that he was taking action ‘to clean up the mess’, Schro¨der created the
‘Hartz Commission’, named after its chairman, Peter Hartz, the personnel director at
Volkswagen. The commission represented a break with the tripartite philosophy of the
Bu¨ndnis fu¨r Arbeit41 in that its 21 members included no more than two trade union rep-
resentatives and only one official of a small-firm business association, the Federation of
Craft Associations (Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks). The commission pro-
posed a list of 13 reform measures, ranging from a weakening of the tripartite structure
of the Bundesagentur to a rather vague appeal to the ‘elites of the nation’ to assist in
creating employment opportunities for the unemployed. The commission’s most import-
ant recommendations were to integrate unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) and
social assistance (Sozialhilfe)42 and to turn the job centres into temporary-employment
agencies (Personalserviceagenturen). Anyone still jobless after six months was to be
placed by the agencies in a private firm to perform temporary work. Hartz claimed
that the commission’s proposals could halve Germany’s unemployment within three
years and slash the costs of unemployment benefit by two-thirds.
After the 2002 election, two ‘Acts Promoting Modern Labour Market Services’
(commonly referred to as ‘Hartz I’ and ‘Hartz II’) were passed, tightening the rules
determining which jobs an unemployed worker was allowed to reject (Zumutbarkeit),
and the conditions for claiming unemployment assistance. In addition, workers facing
unemployment were required to report earlier to the local employment service.
Moreover, the reform raised the earnings limit for low-paid work exempt from
social insurance contributions (Mini-Jobs) and introduced a scale of rising contribution
rates for monthly incomes between E400 and E800. Also, various measures were
passed to promote the employment of older people and the transition of jobless
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workers to self-employment (the so-called Ich AG). Finally, the legislation provided for
the creation of temporary employment agencies on the Hartz model.
In March 2003, shortly after the opposition had gained a solid majority in the
Bundesrat by winning the Land election in Lower Saxony, Chancellor Schro¨der
announced ‘Agenda 2010’ – a package of measures intended to make the German
economy more ‘flexible’ and competitive. In addition to tax cuts and vague promises
to make it easier for firms to opt out of sector-wide industrial agreements, the ‘agenda’
focused on pensions, health care and unemployment insurance. It included a reduction
in Germany’s generous unemployment and sickness benefits and proposed making it
easier for small companies to hire and fire new workers. The measures that were ulti-
mately introduced included a tax cut ofE15 billion, a change in employment protection
rules for companies with up to ten employees, and two more Acts to Promote Modern
Labour Market Services (Hartz III and IV). To gain the agreement of the opposition,
Schro¨der had to reduce the tax cuts which were intended above all to appease the
public – something that CDU and CSU were not willing to let the government pay
for by increased borrowing.
Agenda 2010 reinforced long-existing internal divisions between ‘modernisers’
and traditionalists among German trade unions. Germany’s leading union, IG
Metall, refuses as a matter of principle to take changes in non-wage labour costs
into account when negotiating industry-wide wage increases. It was and still is bitterly
opposed to Agenda 2010, running advertisements in national newspapers attacking the
reforms as ‘one-sided’ and ‘unfair’.43 Its position is reflected in the DGB, whose chair-
man, Michael Sommer, labelled the reforms as ‘dismantling the welfare state’.44 On the
other hand, the head of the chemical workers union IGBCE, Hubertus Schmoldt, urged
unions to ‘play an active role in a search for compromise’,45 proposing that the most
controversial reforms should be tested in a pilot phase. Indeed IGBCE had already
in 1999 concluded collective agreements that included private, supplementary
pension plans and was eager to protect its approach. While the trade unions were debat-
ing, Germany reached the fourth-highest unemployment rate of all OECD countries, at
9.4 per cent, surpassed only by Poland, the Slovak Republic and Spain.46
Hartz III and IV relaxed employment protection for small firms and shortened the
duration of unemployment benefit (Arbeitslosengeld) to 12 months (18 months for
persons aged 55 or more), instead of 32 months in the past. The new rule, however,
will not come into force until 2006.47 The most far-reaching measure of the Hartz
reforms was the amalgamation of unemployment assistance and social assistance
into a single, flat-rate and means-tested benefit calculated according to principles of
social assistance (Arbeitslosengeld II).48 It also involved ending the dualism between
labour exchanges on the one hand and social assistance offices on the other, for
those receiving social assistance other than unemployment benefit. Both the amalgama-
tion of unemployment assistance and social assistance and various measures for a
further tightening of work availability requirements (Zumutbarkeit) were diluted in
the legislative process. Nevertheless, on the day the Bundestag passed the bills, the
Federal Minister of Economics and Labour, Wolfgang Clement, predicted that unem-
ployment would drop by 20 per cent once the reforms were reality.49
The Hartz reforms were designed to lower the threshold of Zumutbarkeit for the
unemployed, and in general to make labour market policy more ‘activating’ by
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increasing incentives to work. Reform of the Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, however, foun-
dered in the face of resistance from SPD backbenchers, trade unions and employer
organisations that fear for the funding of their extensive further education empires.
It remains to be seen how much the Hartz measures will in fact lower expenditure
for unemployment benefit and labour market policy, and with it the unemployment
insurance contribution rate.
The same holds for whether the Hartz reforms will result in lower unemployment.
According to the Council of Economic Experts (Sachversta¨ndigenrat), ‘any attempt to
forecast the volume of unemployment in 2005 is subject to major uncertainty’,50 not
only because of low economic growth but also because Hartz IV will change the
way unemployment is measured. It is even possible that the number of those registered
as unemployed may rise by 300,000, especially in early 2005, due to the fact that
Hartz IV includes former social assistance recipients in the statistics of the
Bundesagentur. In November 2004, the research institute of the Bundesagentur
announced that in 2005 unemployment may reach the politically devastating mark of
five million.51 Uncertainty about the development of unemployment makes the
expected reduction in 2005 of the federal grant to the Bundesagentur from E6.2 to
E4 billion unlikely. This being the case, a reduction of the unemployment contribution
rate seems to be out of reach.
Nevertheless, Agenda 2010 has scared the electorate and made it even more volatile.
It caused devastating defeats for the SPD in the state elections in Bavaria in September
2003 and in Hamburg in March 2004. To add to this, in January 2004 the supervisory
board of the supposedly reformed Bundesagentur – composed of union, employer and
public sector representatives – stated that it had ‘lost confidence’ in the agency’s new
chairman, Florian Gerster, an SPD politician appointed by Schro¨der in the aftermath
of the 2002 scandal. While officially Gerster was blamed for minor irregularities over
contracts for consultants, in fact he was punished for having tried to weaken the influence
of the social partners. During all of 2004, the Bundesagentur remained in turmoil over its
reorganisation. Beginning in 2005, it must pay the government a per capita lump sum
of nearly E10,000 for each and every former recipient of unemployment benefit now
reassigned to the new, tax-financed Arbeitslosengeld II 52 – at a total annual cost of
E6.7 billion.53 Apparent flaws in the new software designed for the disbursement of
Arbeitslosengeld I and II caused additional costs in good will as well as in cash. In
spite of having added thousands of employees to its staff of over 90,000 to cope with
the reform, job placement by the Bundesagentur has come to a virtual standstill.54
HEALTH CARE
In the 1990s, the costs of the German health care system spiralled out of control.
Between 1991 and 2002 spending on health care increased by 36 per cent.55 The
increase was attributable not only to the extension of the health care system to the
new La¨nder but also to disproportionate growth in expenditure on pharmaceuticals
and the introduction of long-term care insurance.56 The rise in spending resulted in
growing contribution rates. Between 1991 and 2002 contribution rates in the old and
new La¨nder increased from 12.2 and 12.8 per cent to 14 per cent.57 During the 1990s
it was health insurance that contributed most to the rise in the overall contribution
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rate to social insurance.58 Currently health insurance contributions account on average
for 14.3 per cent of gross wages, the second largest deduction after pensions.
A large part of the increase in health care expenditure is attributable to a lack of
efficiency incentives and transparency and to over-capacities. The self-governing struc-
ture of the health care system allows doctors and pharmaceutical producers a great
variety of strategies to circumvent government efforts to contain costs. Doctors
enjoy considerable autonomy in writing bills for treatment and setting fees for their ser-
vices. For example, pharmaceutical producers may respond to legal regulation forcing
doctors to prescribe less expensive generic drugs by increasing the size of packages,59
so as to defend their volume of sales.
Since health insurance funds may set contribution rates autonomously within the
context of statutory provisions, the government has even fewer ways of bringing con-
tribution rates in line with the goals of economic reform than is the case with pension
and unemployment insurance. As it is the La¨nder which are primarily responsible for
inpatient care, especially in hospitals, the capacities of the federal government are
additionally limited by far-reaching legislative powers of the Bundesrat. Health care
reform is further complicated by the fact that the Christian Democratic parliamentary
party has always been deeply divided on the issue, particularly on health care finance.
Whereas CDU leader Angela Merkel prefers funding health care by a flat rate to be paid
by everybody (Pra¨mienmodell), the labour wing of her party and the CSU favour the
extension of the insurance-based system to additional groups of employees and
forms of income.
That health care reform is especially difficult in Germany is due also to the self-
governing character of the health care system and the effective organisation of the
many interests involved in it, including big pharmaceutical companies, the doctors’
lobby, the health insurance funds, and the hospitals. The KBV, the main doctors’
association, is particularly effective in defending its clients. Its power derives from
the fact that it functions as a statutory link between the doctors and the health insurance
funds. Thus, the KBV collects the bills on behalf of the doctors and negotiates collec-
tive contracts with the funds. Because of the KBV system, the funds have practically no
control over the treatment doctors provide. Health care funds are reduced to the role of
‘passive financers’ rather than ‘active purchasers of health services from suppliers on
behalf of the patients’.60
As in pension and unemployment insurance, shortly after its election in 1998 the
Red–Green government suspended some of the health care reforms of the Kohl gov-
ernment.61 The 1998 ‘Act to Strengthen Solidarity in Health Insurance’ rescinded
cuts in the statutory reimbursement for dentistry and dropped co-insurance payments
for drugs and other treatment-related costs. It also cancelled the automatic rise in
co-payments with increases in contribution rates. At the same time, to stabilise the
federal budget the government changed the calculation of the contributions paid by
the unemployment insurance fund to the health insurance funds on unemployment
insurance benefits, which resulted in lower revenues for the health insurance
system.62 The overall effect of the measures was to increase expenditures whilst
simultaneously reducing revenues, making further reforms inevitable.
Measures for cost containment subsequently devised by Health Minister Andrea
Fischer, however, were mostly abortive. Proposals for a global ceiling on spending
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and the abolition of dual financing for hospitals were killed off by the opposition in the
Bundesrat. All the government was able to obtain was a reform of hospital finance.
Instead of a standard daily fee per patient, hospitals now receive a lump sum reflecting
the type of treatment, regardless of the length of stay (diagnose-orientierte
Fallpauschalen). Opposition in the Bundesrat was accompanied by a large-scale
campaign involving all the major players in the health sector: doctors’ associations,
the pharmaceutical industry, and the health insurance funds,63 not to mention the
voters. Soon after, in early 2001, Fischer resigned, ostensibly over the BSE crisis.
The new minister, Ulla Schmidt (SPD), lifted the budget caps for prescribed drugs.
Introduced in 1993, this measure had been under constant attack from doctors’ associ-
ations. Schmidt replaced them with a system under which doctors’ associations and
health care funds set spending limits at the regional level. In effect, those responsible
for the increase in expenditure were made responsible for controlling it. With no sanc-
tions against non-compliance, however, the new arrangement for containing spending
proved ineffective.64 In 2002, self-regulation at the implementation level was further
strengthened by the introduction of so-called Disease Management Programmes
(DMPs) for chronic diseases. Under these programmes, an advisory board defines
care standards that are then made obligatory by the federal government. With the
exemption of some minor rule-changes, further reform measures were put on hold
until after the election at the express instruction of the Chancellor.65
After the 2002 election had been won, the government could no longer avoid
confronting the continuing crisis of health care finance. In the first of a series of emer-
gency measures, the ‘Act to Stabilise Contribution Rates’ raised the upper income limit
for the assessment of contributions to the statutory health insurance system to E5,100
per month and obliged health insurance funds to lower their contribution rates.
Moreover, it imposed a zero per cent increase (Nullrunde) for the incomes of
doctors and hospital workers. However, to relieve the federal budget by cutting the
deficit in the unemployment insurance fund the same Act lowered the rate of health
care contributions for persons drawing unemployment assistance, which reduced the
revenue of health insurance funds. Although the Act made it illegal for funds to
raise contribution rates, the Minister for Social Affairs of the Land of Bavaria encour-
aged the local health care funds to do exactly this.
The year 2003 became the year of health care reform. Scandals involving financial
conspiracies between doctors, insurance funds and drug companies alerted the public to
the vulnerability of the health insurance system to abuse and fraud. Among other
things, doctors had used their professional autonomy to mislead health care funds
about the costs of treatment, importing cheap products from abroad but charging full
German prices. With the ‘Act to Modernise the Statutory Health Insurance System’
(GKV-Modernisierungsgesetz), the government sought to address inefficient practices
in the health care system and prevent an expected increase in the contribution rate to up
to 15 per cent in 2004.
The CDU/CSU having by then captured a solid majority in the Bundesrat, the final
legislation could only be passed in agreement with the opposition. It introduced various
measures to control expenditure (such as cancelling funeral benefit) and to strengthen
competition among providers. Overall, however, it imposed most of the burden on
patients rather than doctors or drug companies. Trade unions regarded the reform as
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a historical departure from the principle of parity financing by workers and employers,
and from the principle of solidarity. In part this reflected the fact that from 2006
onwards sickness benefit (Krankengeld) is to be financed solely by the insured.
Equally controversial was the fact that the reform raised health insurance contributions
on company pensions, which partially counteracted the government’s objective of pro-
moting company pensions as a supplement to declining public pensions. Taken as a
whole, the Act sought to reduce the expenditure of the statutory health care funds by
E20 billion, for example through higher supplementary co-payments, flat-rate
charges for visits to doctors’ offices, and the total exclusion of dentures from the list
of standard services.
While cutting the health insurance contribution rate to 13.6 per cent in 2004, the
Act also started a move towards subsidising health care through transfers from the
federal budget. The new transfers, financed mainly through a three-stage increase in
the tobacco tax, are supposed to cover various non-actuarial benefits (versicherungs-
fremde Leistungen). However, as demonstrated in pension insurance, such transfers
can become self-perpetuating. In addition, once introduced, tax-financed transfers
may constrain future fiscal policy.66 With no explicit link to the extent of versicher-
ungsfremde Leistungen, federal subsidies are likely to seep away in an inefficient
system with an endless appetite for fresh cash.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, health care reform in Germany has mainly
amounted to successive increases in co-payments by patients and in government
support, which have hitherto failed to generate lower contribution rates. Government
proposals to expand the funding base, on the model of the Bu¨rgerversicherung, are
being blocked by the CDU, reflecting the traditionally close relations between the
party and the pharmaceutical industry and the associations of doctors and pharma-
cists.67 In November 2004, after long and painful internal discussions, CDU and
CSU presented a reform concept that tries to combine premium, contribution and
tax-based forms of funding. It proposes a monthly premium of E109 to be paid by
every insured person, supplemented by an additional E60 paid by employers –
whose share would be limited to 6.5 per cent of gross wages – and by tax-financed
subsidies to individuals with low income.
While there is deadlock on the financing side, cost-cutting on the supply side
continues to meet with effective resistance from providers and the drug industry.
Short-term emergency measures have reached their limit, and the view is gaining
ground that nothing short of major restructuring will help. How such restructuring
can be made to happen politically, however, is a mystery. Instead of a decline in con-
tribution rates, the reform of 2003 will at best provide for stability over two or three
years, although even this seems uncertain, as major health insurance funds have
stated publicly that they see no possibility of cuts in contribution rates in 2005.
CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS
In 1995 at the latest, with non-wage labour costs approaching the magic threshold of
40 per cent, cutting the economic burden imposed by the Bismarckian welfare state
on the employment relationship in a changing economy and society became a
central concern of German domestic politics, for the last Kohl cabinet as well as for
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the two successive governments of the Red–Green coalition under Gerhard Schro¨der.
However, after eight years of sometimes dramatic political conflict over welfare state
reform, by 2003 non-wage labour costs, far from having come down, had risen further
by two percentage points, with no end in sight (see Table 1).
If reforming the German welfare state continues to be as hopeless as it was for
almost a decade, Germany’s economic prospects are bound to deteriorate further.
For some time, such deterioration may still proceed gradually and will therefore
remain barely perceptible in the short-term view that dominates politics, public com-
mentary and much of academic analysis. Weak employment will remain the core
predicament of the German economy. While domestically traded services will stagnate,
job losses in Germany’s traditionally strong sector, high-quality manufacturing, will
accelerate, not least due to the high German social insurance contributions. High
spending on social welfare transfers will continue, to a large extent in compensation
for low employment. Very likely, this will increasingly be accompanied by protest
from those whose benefits must be cut in order to keep total expenditure constant or,
more realistically, prevent it from rising by more than the small increments that can
be presented to the public as conjunctural fluctuations.68 And, given the tightening con-
straints on taxation of all sorts, the transfer-heavy welfare state, which at best mollifies
the impact of low employment but cannot create employment itself, will continue to
leave little if any space for public investment in the sort of infrastructure required to
maintain the international competitiveness of a high-wage economy like Germany.
What prevents a fundamental restructuring – and nothing else would probably do –
of a welfare state that is now widely recognised as strangling the labour market? At first
glance it appears nothing short of astonishing that shifting the funding base of social
insurance from contributions to general taxes should be politically difficult at all.
Not only is there no reason in principle why such a shift should imply lower benefits,
or why it should raise the total level of taxation including social insurance
contributions. Also, a tax-based welfare state would be more redistributive and egali-
tarian than a contribution-based one, if only because contributions are usually paid only
up to a specified income ceiling while income taxes, apart from a country like Slovakia,
tend to be more or less progressive under democratic government.
A range of factors may be listed that have in the past decade stood in the way of
meaningful welfare state reform in Germany, and will very likely continue to do so
in the coming decade.
1. As has been shown, the pension and unemployment insurance funds are already
heavily subsidised by the Federal Government, and subsidies have increased in
recent years. Calls from the social policy community for tax support are not
unknown to the Finance Minister, who from past experience tends to regard them
as attempts to avoid cuts in benefits. Afraid of pouring fresh money into what invari-
ably seemed to them a bottomless pit, all recent Finance Ministers have tried to
make further subsidies conditional on structural reforms. The fact that they have
rarely succeeded does not make them more amenable to proposals to shift the
funding of the welfare state even further towards general taxes.
2. In any case, the first priority for the Federal Government is balancing its budget, not
expanding it. The main criterion by which the performance of the Finance Minister
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is judged year by year is whether his budget meets the targets of the Maastricht
Stability Pact. These oblige him to reduce, not unemployment, but public borrow-
ing. For some time now, German governments have in addition been under relent-
less pressure from business and the general public to lower corporate and individual
taxes. Balancing the budget while cutting taxes leaves little space for refinancing
social insurance.69 This was experienced most dramatically by the CDU which,
at its Leipzig party convention in late 2003, came out with great fanfare for both
deep tax cuts and a complete de-coupling of public health insurance from wage
and employment. The new system (a flat rate contribution called Kopfpauschale)
implied that households with a low income were given tax subsidies. As was to
be expected, the two projects turned out to be incompatible. Also unsurprisingly,
the CDU later stuck to its tax cuts and abandoned the Kopfpauschale.
3. The trade unions, and in part also the employers, insist on separate parafiscal
budgeting of social insurance, and on its being funded in principle by independent
sources of revenue. Of course, unions in particular have no objections to social
insurance being subsidised by the state, if this helps sustain or even expand benefits.
An entirely tax-funded welfare state, however, is considered to be at the mercy of
party politics and of government fiscal consolidation efforts, more than parafiscal
institutions collecting contributions from workers and employers and operating
under the ‘self-government’ of the ‘social partners’. Employment concerns
remain secondary as long as benefits for the non-employed can be defended, not
least by pressuring the government to cover possible deficits in social insurance
budgets. Employers, on their part, while certainly not averse to lower contributions,
prefer lower taxes if they must choose, probably because a tax-based welfare state
would be much more redistributive. Moreover, while German employers have
become adroit at shifting employment to countries with lower labour costs, they
may still have to pay income and corporate taxes in Germany. Finally, both
union and employer associations cherish the many opportunities for patronage
offered especially by the unemployment insurance system and the Bundesagentur
fu¨r Arbeit that administers it.
4. The deadlock in German welfare state reform is not, however, exclusively caused
by the undoubtedly impressive number of veto points and veto players in
Germany’s political system. The conservative welfare state and the A¨quivalenzprin-
zip by which it is largely governed (the principle that benefits have to be basically
proportionate to contributions, which in turn are proportionate to earned income)
are popular with German voters, far into the middle class. The idea that status-
securing social insurance entitlements are something like private property, rather
than the outflow of a public right to social citizenship, is deeply rooted and is
reinforced by German legal doctrine, which tends to impose narrow limits on pol-
itical discretion with respect to earned entitlements. This corresponds to the fact that
flat-rate benefits are widely considered incompatible with social justice.
In recent years, Germans have become wary of anything introduced to them as
‘reform’, which they probably rightly expect to end up in a reduction or levelling of
their benefits. Resistance to change has assumed traits that an outside observer
might easily be tempted to consider nothing short of irrational. In a representative
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survey conducted in 2004, 50 per cent of the German adult population agreed that the
social insurance systems faced ‘significant problems’ and another 44 per cent believed
that they were ‘about to collapse’. Still, 50 per cent stated that they were unwilling to
retire later; 80 per cent did not find it necessary to lower the level of pensions; 68 per
cent believed there was no need for employees to pay higher social insurance contri-
butions; 69 per cent rejected the idea that health insurance funds might have to cut
benefits; and no less than 80 per cent disagreed with increasing the legal age of retire-
ment gradually to 67 years.70
Thus by the end of 2004, welfare state reform is taking more ‘time out’. Faced with
public protest against Hartz IV, the government concluded already in the middle of its
term that voters had had enough of change for the time being. Now the strategy is
essentially a return to the ‘policy of a calm hand’ (Politik der ruhigen Hand) of the
summer of 2001, in the hope of some sort of spin-off from global economic recovery
carrying the coalition over the September 2006 election. An important political side
benefit of government inactivity is that it might tempt the opposition to make even
more unpopular reforms a centrepiece of its election platform, predictably
accompanied by two years of publicly displayed internal disagreement over how far
such reforms may have to go. New serious attempts to break the stranglehold of the
German welfare state on the German labour market will not be made until 2007 at
the earliest, and are unlikely to come into force before 2008. In the meantime the gov-
erning parties hope that the continuing structural disintegration of the German social
market economy can be covered up by a little fresh paint on its fac¸ade, like forcing
the health insurance funds by law to put off repaying their debt and instead keep con-
tribution rates constant or even lower them by a symbolic fraction. Once again it would
appear that, according to an old German political adage, Wahltag will be Zahltag.
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